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RECENT CASES
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-BAR ASSOCIATION-CONSTITUTION-

BAR-Plaintiff, a Wisconsin lawyer,
paying dues under protest to the treasurer of the State Bar
brought an action alleging unconstitutional compulsion. It
was argued that he could not be constitutionally compelled to
join and give support to an organization using its funds and
employees for purposes of influencing legislation and public
opinion toward legislation. The United States Supreme
Court, two justices dissenting, held that the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin may constitutionally require a lawyer to share
the costs of sustaining the legal profession even though the
organization itself engages in some legislative activities. However the Court declined to rule on the question of whether the
lawyer's constitutional rights of free speech are infringed if
his dues are used to support financially the activities of an
organization in support of views he opposes. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S. 820 (1961).
ALITY OF THE INTEGRATED

An integrated bar has been judicially defined as "the process by which every member of the bar is given an opportunity to do his part in performing the public service expected of
him, and by which each member is obliged to bear his portion
of the responsibility".' The integrated bar is independent and
free to conduct its activities within the framework of its rules
and bylaws subject to the supervisory rules of the court.'
There are three methods by which a state may implement
integration: statute ;3 statute plus court rule;' and court rule.'
Courts in states not having an integrated bar have noted this
1. Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1949).
2. In re Intergration of the Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 93 N.W.2d 601 (1958).
3. Code of Ala. Recomplied, Tit. 46 §21-§62 (1958); Alaskan Integrated Bar Act. 1955 Session Laws, ch. 196; Ark. Stat. Ann. Rule 28 (1946);
Ann. Cal. Codes, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §6000 to §6154 (West 1956); Idaho
Code §3-101 to §3-420 (1949); Miss. Code Ann. §8685 to §8724 (1942); Nev.
Rev. Stat. §7.270 to §7.6000 (1957); N.M. Stat.' Ann. §18-1-1 to §18-1-27
(1953); N.C. Gen. Stat. §84-15 to §84-37 (1943); N.D. Cent. Code ch. 27-12
(1961); Ore. Rev. Stat. §9.010 to §9.10 (1953); S.D. Code §32.1113 to §32.1124 (1939); Utah Code Ann. §78-51-1 to §78-51-44 (1953); Rev. Code of
Wash. §2.48.010 to §2.48.230.
4. Ky. Rev. Stat. §30.010 to §30.990 (1960); La. Rev. Stat. §37:211 to
37:218 (1950); Mich. Stat. §691.51 to §691.52 (1948); Tex. Stat. §320 Art.
I to XII (Vernon 1948); Va. Code §54-48 to §54-52 (1950); W.Va. Code Ann.
§5183 (1) (1955); Wis. Stat. Ann. §256.31 (1958); Sess Laws Wyo. Chapt. 97
(1939).
5. Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n., 40 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1949);
In re Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265 (1937); In re
Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla. 505, 95 P.2d 113 (1939).
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inherent power of the state's Supreme Court to integrate.' The
United States Supreme Court has noted that a tax may be imposed on lawyers as a group.' The Federal District Court for
the District of Columbia has upheld a local fee requirement
established for the attorneys of that District
The major limitation upon the state's power to regulate the
privilege to practice law is that the regulation must not contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.! To determine the constitutionality
of compulsory membership the court must balance0 the public
interest in raising the quality of the legal profession against
private interest of the lawyer in his individual liberty. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court found the public interest to be controlling."
Payment of compulsory bar dues is a condition as fully
justified by state needs as the payment of compulsory dues
to the union shop is justified by Federal needs." This may be
seen in the Hanson case," requiring compulsory payment of
union dues, which should lay. aside all doubt that a state may
condition the right to practice law upon membership in an
integrated bar."
North Dakota, the first state to integrate its bar,'5 has held
that the legislature may compel a lawyer to contribute to the
State Bar Fund.
The rationale of these cases is that compulsory membership
and financial support may be constitutionally imposed so long
as the individual attorney retains freedom of expression and
a right to dissent. Integration of the state bar will best serve
the public interest by giving forceful expression to the majorIn re Unification of Montana Bar Ass'n, 107 Mont. 599, 87 P.2d 172
6.
(1939); In re Petition for Integration of the Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn.
195, 12 N.W.2d 515 (1943); see Petition for Rule of Court Activating, Integration and Unifying the State Bar of Tennessee, 199 Tenn. 78, 282 S.W.2d
782 (1955).
irgina, 116 U.S. 572 (1886).
7. Royall v.
8. Laughlin v. Clephane, 77 F. Supp. 103 (1947).
9. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
10. See generally, as to the "balancing test": Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1958); Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147
(1939); National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. State of
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
11. Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (1960).
12. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 470 (1960).
13. Railway Employees Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
14. - Id. at 238. "On the present record there is no more an infringement
or impairing of First Amendment Rights than there would be in the case
of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an integrated
bar."
15. Laws of N. Dak. 1921, ch. 25, § 1.
16. Goer v. Taylor, 51 N.D. 792, 200 N.W. 898 (1924).
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ity view of the state's lawyers with respect to legislation affecting the administration of justice and the practice of law.
GEORGE R. LAWRENCE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-RULES OF
EVIDENCE--ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE-

Defendant's home was forcibly entered by several police officers who conducted a complete search of the home without a
search warrant. The defendant was convicted of having in her
possession obscene materials' which were discovered in the
illegal search. The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the validity
of the conviction.- Upon appeal the United States Supreme
Court held, three justices dissenting, that evidence obtained
by unconstitutional search was inadmissible in state prosecution. Thus conviction was vitiated under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the landmark case of Wolf v. Colorado'
which had stood inviolate for 12 years was overruled.
The dissent maintained that the majority in overruling
Wolf, instead of passing upon the-constitutionality of section
2905.34 of the Ohio Revised Code, chose the more difficult
and less appropriate of the two constitutional questions involved. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
Illegally seized evidence, formerly admissible in state
courts, has now been declared inadmissible because of its unconstitutional nature. The first specific reference made to
evidence as being unconstitutional arose in Boyd v. United
States in 1886.' In 1914 the Supreme Court adopted the federal exclusionary rule' with respect to evidence illegally obtained. The Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado' 1949 declared
that the right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment was
enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. However the court decided
that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon
1. Ohio Rev. Code § 2905.34 (1953) provides in part that "no lerson
shall knowingly . . . have in his possession or under his control an obscene, lewd, or lascivious book . . . (or) picture..."
2. State v. Mapp. 170 Ohio St. 427, 430, 166 N.E.2d 387, 390 (1960). The
Supreme Court of Ohio found that her conviction was valid though "based
primarily upon the Introduction in evidence of books and pictures unlawfully seized during an unlawful search of defendant's home."
3. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
4. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Claimant was compelled to produce an incriminatory invoice upon which conviction was based-held, unconstitutional as
being
theUnited
prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.
5. within
Weeks v.
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In a federal prosecution
the fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure. The Weeks rule is codified in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41
(e). 6. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).

